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Every four years, the cry goes up to destroy the Electoral College.
That cry is especially loud in years when a candidate is elected president
who receives a minority of the votes. The election of a “minority
president” happened with the election of 2000, but it had happened
before.1
The Electoral College has elected three presidents whom a majority
of the voters voted against: Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876,2 Benjamin
Harrison in 1888,3 and George W. Bush in 2000.4 (A fourth president
was also elected with a minority of the popular vote—John Quincy
Adams in 1824—though that election was by the House of
Representatives, the Electoral College not having produced a majority of
electors.5)
Against these recurrent cries are occasional voices of dissent,
arguing for one reason or another that majority rule is not the highest
value of a republic. So does this Essay, arguing to keep the Electoral
*
Dean and Charles E. Cantú Distinguished Professor of Law, St. Mary’s
University School of Law. The arguments below were significantly enhanced by the able
research assistance of Mary Christian Barr. I am grateful to Howard Schweber and the
Wisconsin Law Review for their invitation to attend this symposium.
1.
See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
2.
On the election of Hayes over Samuel Tilden, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 (2004).
3.
On the election of Harrison over Grover Cleveland, see CHARLES W.
CALHOUN, MINORITY VICTORY: GILDED AGE POLITICS AND THE FRONT PORCH CAMPAIGN
OF 1888 (2008).
4.
Among the comment on the election, or selection, of President Bush over
Al Gore and judicial intervention in the Florida election, see A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).
5.
For 1824 race, see LYNN HUDSON PARSONS, THE BIRTH OF MODERN
POLITICS: ANDREW JACKSON, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, AND THE ELECTION OF 1828, at
69‒108 (2009).
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College, even were the rest of the Constitution subject to wholesale
revision.
That said, there is room for improvement. The Electoral College
should function nearer to its original design by restoring elector
independence through a reduction in the power of the political parties
over the electors and by a reduction of the silliest aspects of federal
election law. Though the election law generally is beyond the argument
here, it has to be said that unlimited money corrupts the ballot and
foolishly bounded districts corrupt the Congress, and reforming both
would likely diminish the risks before and after resort to the Electoral
College.
I. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
In the name given in the United States Code, the President of the
United States is chosen by a College of Electors.6 Each state has as many
electors as it has members in Congress—with three electors from the
District of Columbia—totaling 538 electors.7 The electors are chosen by
whatever manner their jurisdiction selects on the day of the popular vote,
which, in the language of the Constitution, is the “Time of choosing the
Electors.”8 The electors meet in their home jurisdiction in mid-December
to cast their votes, which are tallied in Washington, D.C., early in
January.9 Whoever wins a majority of this vote is elected President of the
United States.10
Given the later complaints against a system that limits democracy,
some understanding of how it arose is helpful. Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia intended the Electoral College
to balance the interests of small states and large states, to give the chief
executive independence from the Congress, and most of all, to insure the
chief magistrate should be selected by highly informed voters of
excellent judgment and independence, who represent the diverse interests
6.
7.

3 U.S.C. §§ 1–17 (2012 & Supp. 2013).
Article II, Section 1 provides:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2. The District of Columbia was given three Electoral votes in
the Twenty-Third Amendment, ratified in 1961. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
9.
3 U.S.C. §§ 7, 15.
10.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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of the various states, free from the influence of foreign nations or special
interests.11 Indirect election of the executive was one of the great
compromises of the convention.12
This method of indirect election was the object of much discussion
during the Constitutional Convention. Some delegates, such as Roger
Sherman, desired the president to be selected by the Congress13 or, like
John Rutledge at one point, only by the Senate.14 Some believed the
president should be chosen by the states, such as, per Elbridge Gerry,
selection by their governors.15 What seemingly only James Wilson early
hoped to see would be direct election by the people, a hope he realized
was shared by few other delegates.16 Thus, on June 2, he proposed a
moderated form of election so that a popular vote would elect
presidential electors in each state.17 Wilson’s moderated proposal was
taken up a month later by Oliver Ellsworth, who recommended state
electors chosen by legislators.18 James Madison, a few days later, forayed
into the debate, inventorying the problems with both direct election of
the president by the people and direct election by the Congress or the
various officers of the states.19 He approved of the system of electors,
though he, with Wilson, remained in the minority who preferred a system
of direct election.20
The arguments, then, against a direct election were and remain
significant. One of these stands against election of the president by the
people was raised by Elbridge Gerry, who thought a popular election was
“radically vicious;” the popular voters not knowing the candidates would
be too easily swayed by influential members of a national organization.21
Such arguments succeeded only intermittently, and in May, the proposal
for Article II, Section One was based initially on congressional

11.
Gary L. Gregg II, The Origins and Meaning of the Electoral College, in
SECURING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1, 8 (Gary L. Gregg II
ed., 2001).
12.
See TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE 45‒59 (2004).
13.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 68 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION] (remarks of Madison).
14.
Id. at 69.
15.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 109 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION] (remarks of Madison).
16.
Gregg II, supra note 11, at 5.
17.
1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 80 (remarks of Madison).
18.
2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 57 (remarks of Madison).
19.
Id. at 109–11, 114 (remarks of Madison).
20.
Id. at 109. (remarks of Madison). For the views of Wilson, see id. at 106.
21.
Id. at 114. (remarks of Madison).
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selection.22 The proposal for electors was revived, however, by Governor
Morris and Charles Carroll.23 That proposal failed, but it was then
referred to the Committee of Eleven, who drafted the article with the
electors from states selected in the manner state legislatures determine.24
Defended by Morris, Wilson, Gerry, and with numerous nips and tucks,
the proposal emerged from the Committee of Style in nearly its final
form.25
The office of elector was seen as a role of great responsibility. In
arguing for ratification, Alexander Hamilton described the electors as
people of discernment, capable of investigating the qualities of the
candidates and deliberating among themselves to determine the person
best fit for office.26 Describing their role, Justice Story wrote a
generation later that any one of these “small number of persons, selected
by their fellow citizens from the general mass for this special object,
would be most likely to possess the information, and discernment, and
independence, essential for the proper discharge of the duty.”27
II. A FEW ARGUMENTS CON AND PRO
There are both principled and pragmatic arguments against the
Electoral College. It limits majoritarian democracy.28 It is contrary to the
idea that each person’s vote weighs equally in a fair election, the
principle of “one person, one vote.”29 It does not help minority interest
groups.30 It diminishes the sense of connection between voters and the
22.
See 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 21 (remarks of Madison);
TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
31–34 (2d 2012) (discussing the compromise of the Electoral College after deadlock
between choice by Congress and direct election).
23.
2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 402–04. (remarks of Madison).
24.
Id. at 497 (remarks of Madison).
25.
See id. at 572‒73. Various changes would be made, not the least being the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, ratified just in time for the 1804 election and
correcting the danger of a confused vote between candidates for president and vice
president. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 92 (1994).
26.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
27.
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 315 § 1451 (1833).
28.
See Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is
Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1523, 1534.
29.
See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers,
Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2544–45 (2001)
[hereinafter Rethinking the Electoral College].
30.
See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR
AMERICA 92‒121 (2004).
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chief executive and the legitimacy of the government as a whole.31 More
interesting, perhaps, is the idea that the Electoral College wrongly
perpetuates a national role for states in a system of government that has
become increasingly centralized and in which states are relegated to
genuinely local matters. Thus, the system of indirect voting places
extraordinary significance on the outcome of every state’s election, even
when a significant national majority favors one candidate, leading a
problem in a single state to produce a nationally doubtful outcome, even
when there was a clear preference by the national polity that would
otherwise have made the state issue irrelevant.
There are largely pragmatic reasons to keep the Electoral College. It
often acts to create a clear mandate even in a close race.32 Abraham
Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Bill Clinton all won decisively in the
Electoral College, despite failing to gather a convincing majority of
popular votes, owing either to a close popular vote or the effect of
third-party candidates.33 Thus, the legitimacy of a presidency, or the
government of a whole, can be enhanced by the “moderating” influence
of the indirect election.34 The effect on states has been not to diminish
but to enhance direct access by voters to the process.35 And, most
obviously, the need to acquire electoral votes requires candidates to win
some of their support nationally rather than seeking overwhelming
support in just a single state or region of the country that happens to have
an outsized population or merely a high voter turnout.36

31.
See, e.g., Christopher Anglim, A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the
Electoral College: Its Creation, History, and Prospects for Reform, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 297,
313 (1993).
32.
See Walter Berns, Outputs: The Electoral College Produces Presidents, in
SECURING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE, supra note 11, at 115.
33.
Cynthia R. Farnia, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the
Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 128 & nn.63–64 (2000). The
potential for the Electoral College to create the appearance of a clear mandate following a
close election is seen by some as an advantage. Yet in 1968, Richard Nixon’s
overwhelming electoral victory following his narrow defeat of Hubert Humphrey led
Congressman Emanuel Celler and Senator Birch Bayh, with Nixon’s blessing, nearly to
end the Electoral College and replace it with election by plurality of the popular vote. See
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM 129–78 (1972).
34.
See Paul A. Rahe, Moderating the Political Impulse, in SECURING
DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE, supra note 11, at 55, 55.
35.
See James R. Stoner Jr., Federalism, the States, and the Electoral College,
in SECURING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE, supra note 11, at 43,
43.
36.
See Rethinking the Electoral College, supra note 29, at 2543–44.

SHEPPARD – FINAL

6

2/6/15 4:24 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW ONLINE
III. A FLY IN THE OINTMENT

Many conditions of national politics were unforeseen by the
Framers: the sheer size of the country and its population being perhaps
the most obvious. Yet the unforeseen condition that has most affected
presidential elections may be the rise of political parties.37
The influence of the parties in the state process of elector selection
is profound. States have delegated the process of elector selection to
political parties, who select the electors to represent the parties’
candidates.38 In these states, voters have little impetus to choose the
elector except as a commitment to the candidate for whom the elector is
designated on the ballot. Indeed in many states, the voter never even
knows the name of the electors for whom the voter casts a ballot.39 Thus,
every elector is ostensibly committed to vote for the candidate of the
party that has designated that elector.
The possibility that this commitment will not be honored has been
of long-standing concern. Indeed it has occurred sufficiently often that
there is an accepted and quite derogatory label for the “faithless electors”
who refuse to follow their orders.40 The potential for electors to break
faith with their parties has led a majority of states to enact pledge
statutes, requiring an elector to pledge to vote for a candidate in order to
be placed on the ballot.41 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld these laws,
at least as to party primaries in the presidential election.42 Even so, it is
not clear that pledge statutes would be enforceable or upheld in a general
election.43
The influence of political parties in the state process—and the
resulting state reliance on those parties in elector selection and
enculturation—has degraded the Electoral College from a deliberation
among leading public citizens into a mechanistic ritual of political
operatives. Though the elector’s partisan commitment contributes to the
democratic nature of the process, it also diminishes the significance of

37.
See A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1992).
38.
Who are the Electors?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.
gov/federal-register/electoral-college/electors.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
39.
See id.
40.
See Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble
Aplenty Brewing Just Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
121 (2006).
41.
As of November 2000, 27 states had such laws. Who are the Electors?,
supra note 38.
42.
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
43.
Id. at 230–31.
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the role and the apparent independence of the elector, the defining aspect
of the office in the republic. This conversion of the elector’s commitment
from fidelity to the nation to fidelity to a political party, if successful,
destroys a system created not only as a check on the potentially misled
polity but also as a check on a potentially corrupted process.
IV. THE MORAL ELECTOR AND THE DECEMBER SURPRISE
An elector for the President of the United States of America has a
particular, moral obligation to safeguard the democratic process in the
republic which cannot be performed without any discretion at all.44
Regardless of the general presumptions that arise owing to a generally
successful electoral process of popular election, the Framers saw a
variety of reasons to maintain an independent agency that moderated the
indirect process of election. Among these were concern against
interference by foreign powers, fraud by candidates, and—perhaps most
presciently—the corrupting influence of large, national organizations that
might deceive local voters.45 Those concerns have hardly diminished
over time.
This is not to suggest that there should not be a presumption that
electors will perform their now customary roles. As Justice Reed noted in
Ray v. Blair,46 there is a “long-continued practical interpretation of the
constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge” by an elector to cast
the ballot for that elector’s party’s candidate.47
For elections within the rough parameters of a reasonable elector’s
expectations, the implication is this: an elector will commit to represent a
given candidate because the elector believes that candidate is the finest
available candidate for president.48 That commitment is offered to voters
in primaries and the general election, and the elector knows that voters
rely on the commitment, creating a strong presumption that the elector
will vote for the designated candidate as the elector had committed to do.
How that presumption might be enforced is a different issue, but it is
presently both a moral and vaguely legal presumption that deserves
respect and potentially deserves enforcement, so long as it is not
rebutted.

44.
See, e.g., Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and
the Popular Vote, 12 J. L. & POL. 665, 675–89 (1996).
45.
2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 108–15 (remarks of Madison).
46.
343 U.S. 214.
47.
Id. at 229‒30.
48.
For ease of discussion, we can leave aside, for now, the complication of
votes for the vice president.
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Yet, there will be elections that do not satisfy a reasonable elector’s
expectations. There genuinely are circumstances in which an elector’s
hopes prior to the election are dashed thereafter, leading to a moral
consequence that places fidelity to the republic in conflict with fidelity to
the party, or at least in conflict with fidelity to the party’s nominee for
office.
This is not to say that every cough in a campaign leads to disease at
the election. To some degree, expectations are bound to be challenged in
a U.S. election. This is the point of the exercise when candidates,
campaigns, or their allies attempt suddenly to change the dynamic of a
nearly completed election campaign by seizing on an event or revelation
about the character or conduct of the candidates at the eleventh hour,
controlling the narrative near Election Day. This is the so-called October
surprise.49
Even so, an event may occur or a revelation may be reliably made
such that an elector’s reasonable expectations are in fact frustrated so
considerably that the elector cannot in good conscience make good on
the commitment to vote for a given candidate and still believe that the
elector has performed the office for the good of the country. In such a
case the elector cannot be morally bound to the commitment to a given
candidate. If the elector cannot morally be bound to the commitment,
then reliance on the customary expectation of a commitment would
clearly be misplaced, and the fundamental basis by which the Supreme
Court has upheld a state requirement of such a commitment would fail.
Indeed, in the light of a moral challenge to an elector’s prior commitment
to a candidate, one must consider that the purpose for which the office of
elector was created was for the elector to exercise discretion.50 A state
law that would thwart a federal elector’s discretion at an extraordinary
time when it reasonably must be exercised would clearly violate Article
II and the Twelfth Amendment.
What types of events or revelations would meet such criteria? The
most obvious one would be the death or incapacity of the candidate
between the popular election and the electoral vote six weeks later.
49.
The “October surprise” is, of course, a revelation made in the final weeks of
a campaign that alters voter perception of a candidate, usually for the worse. See, e.g.,
JACK W. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, BLUE SMOKE AND MIRRORS: HOW REAGAN WON
AND WHY CARTER LOST THE ELECTION OF 1980, at 1–22 (1981). The phrase entered the
American policy lexicon in 1956: the original October surprise being the Russian
intervention in Hungary in October 1956. See Walter Cronkite, A Huge ‘October
Surprise,’ 50 Years Later, NPR (Oct. 23, 2006, 4:00PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=6369922.
50.
Ross & Josephson, supra note 44, at 675. The moral exercise of discretion
is the essence of legal office. See STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL
OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009).
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Though one might think that a vice presidential nominee would be
reasonably expected to be selected, this is not always clear. There
certainly could be circumstances in which a reasonable elector would be
unwilling to substitute the vice presidential candidate. Imagine, for
instance, that Ross Perot had won the election in November 1992 but
then had died the following week, leaving as his successor, Admiral
James Stockdale, the vice presidential candidate on Perot’s ticket.
Admiral Stockdale was a brilliant and valiant sailor but an uninspiring
candidate. Though he might well have made a better president than Mr.
Perot, an elector confronted with him as a substitute nominee might
reasonably have refused to elect him president.51
The death of a president just after the popular election might seem
like a far-fetched concern. On the contrary, it has nearly happened
before, as with the attempts to assassinate Abraham Lincoln before his
inauguration or the death of William Henry Harrison after less than a
month in office, likely from enteric fever he contracted before the
election.52
A problem more difficult for the elector and the institution arises if
there is a “December surprise.” This would be an event or a revelation
between the popular election and the casting of votes six weeks or so
later that places the winner of the November election in a light that casts
meaningful and well supported doubt on the winner’s fitness for office.
This, too, might seem too exotic to be the basis for constitutional
concern, yet a significant example has recently come to light. What
would an elector have made of a credible, even compelling, revelation in
late November 1968 of what was then suspected but only of late
confirmed? No less an observer than President Lyndon B. Johnson
become convinced that Richard Nixon had in fact acted to cause South
Vietnam to reject the cease-fire treaty then being negotiated by the
Johnson administration.53 Nixon’s private intervention to thwart the
51.
See PETER GOLDMAN ET AL., QUEST FOR THE PRESIDENCY 1992, at 566‒67
(1994).
52.
As to Lincoln, see DANIEL STASHOWER, THE HOUR OF PERIL: THE SECRET
PLOT TO MURDER LINCOLN BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2013). As to Harrison, see Jane
McHugh & Philip A. Mackowiak, What Really Killed the President?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2014, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/science/what-really-killedwilliam-henry-harrison.html.
53.
See David Taylor, The Lyndon Johnson Tapes: Richard Nixon's ‘Treason,’
BBC NEWS MAGAZINE, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21768668 (last updated
Mar. 22, 2013, 2:46PM). Nixon did this, and Johnson knew it in November of 1968, but
the record only became known to the public in 2013 with the release of Johnson’s official
recordings. Id. Johnson remained quiet about Nixon’s duplicity precisely because he
feared the harm to the government from public acknowledgment of Nixon’s duplicity and
of the spying on diplomats by which the evidence had been accumulated. See id. The
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diplomacy of the United States and prolong the war, which he ordered
and was carried out by a campaign aide,54 violated federal criminal law,
lengthened the Vietnam War, and led to the unnecessary deaths of tens of
thousands (including twenty-one thousand U.S. service members),
strictly for Nixon’s political benefit.55
Such an action, had it become known in the November or December
before the electors voted, would quite likely have been considered
treason. Johnson thought it was. In all events, it would have made clear
that Nixon valued his election above his commitment to the nation. An
elector confronted by such a shocking revelation would surely have been
morally reasonable in refusing to vote for such a person and in choosing
another person for whom to vote.
Granted, a presumption that an elector ought to abide by the
commitment, limited so that the presumption could be overcome by
timely circumstance, invites perverse incentives. A rival might delay a
revelation in order to offer it a time that would cause electors to overturn
a popular vote. A successful candidate might do anything to cover up
such a revelation until after being finally elected in January. Neither
potential, however, can overcome the more compelling danger of an
elector who is constitutionally mandated to elect the president who lacks
the discretion to refuse a candidate for the presidency whom the elector
knows to be unfit. The elector’s duty to act on such knowledge is all the
more compelling when the elector knows that the voters who supported
the eventual winner did not know of the event or of the knowledge that
demonstrates the winner’s unfitness for office.
It is worth noting here that I do not think that a revelation or event
that is sufficiently well known to the polity prior to an election would as
easily allow an elector to overcome the presumption of commitment.
Even raising such a contrast illustrates the dangers of an elector
departing from the elector’s commitment to the party’s candidate. Who
should judge whether an elector would appropriately refuse to honor a
prior commitment to the candidate or whether a revelation occurred
sufficiently early or was sufficiently understood by the electorate?
Would such a case be within the scope of judicial review? Would it be a
irony, of course, is that Johnson’s decision only forestalled the eventual demise of the
Nixon administration.
54.
See George F. Will, Richard Nixon’s Long Shadow, WASH. POST (Aug. 6,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-f-will-nixons-long-shadow/
2014/08/06/fad8c00c-1ccb-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html.
55.
As to casualties in 1969 and later, see Nat'l Archives, Statistical
Information about Fatal Casualties of the Vietnam War, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html
(last
updated Aug. 2013).
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case for regulation, or juridical oversight, or left to Congress to consider
later through impeachment?
The answer should be that legal inquiry is available for such
questions even if it leads to much unloved delay in the final
determination. An elector, or group of electors, who casts votes contrary
to the prior commitment to a given candidate should justify their actions
on the stage of American law (although their expenses should be borne at
the taxpayer’s expense). Judicial review is appropriate to determine that
the reliance of voters on the elector’s commitment, and the elector’s own
earlier commitment, is sufficient or insufficient to overcome the elector’s
reasonable, good faith belief that the elector must break the commitment.
If the courts rule otherwise, there would likely still be no penalty beyond
a declaration against the elector. Congress would have to enact new
legislation, but these ambiguities in themselves are no reason not to do
so.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The Electoral College provides a constitutional check on democratic
error, a mistake made by the polity even in its most solemn electoral
task. Additionally, electoral voting requires a successful candidate for the
presidency to carry the vote in at least two regions of the nation (though
demographic change in future centuries may alter this condition, which is
still true in the present).
More, the Electoral College places individuals with judgment and
discretion in a position to exercise those talents. In some circumstances,
the elector must have the discretion to choose best as that elector
understands “the best.” If a state or other government attempts to thwart
such independence among the electors, judicial review should be
available to assess the conditions of the vote.
Such an approach to presidential elections has the benefit of hewing
more closely to the original intent of Article II. Yet its more compelling
rationale is that this republican system protects the democratic process
from unfit candidates whose masks slip before the election is final.
Interestingly, this approach is compatible with the law as it is written in
the text of Constitution and federal statutes. It is even compatible with
the precedents of the Supreme Court, though not necessarily with state
laws.
So understood, the Electoral College should be retained.

